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No less '1ban Che Hundred Years or Argentine Econanic Hietory, 
Plus Some Cor!J?arisons 
car1os F. n!az Alejandro* 
Yale University 
1. Im'ROOOCTION 
'1he eccnornic progress or the Argentine Republic since about the middle 
of the last century rema:1ns one of the rost puzzling and misunderstood national 
stories in the developn51t literature. This essay will succinctly present the 
salient facts of the Argentine story and will advance sane interpretations 
regarding Argentine perfonnance. Many big and difficult questions will remain 
unanswered, but it is hoped that the quantification of major trends will serve 
at least to rule out sane of the silliest non-questions and assertions about 
Argentina often found in the literature. 
It should be helpful to contrast Argentine evolutioo with those of two 
countries, one which has been ahead of, and another behind, the econanic indi­
cators for Argentina. Many choices are possible: early this century Argentines 
liked to neasure their country's progress against those of the United States or 
Canada. Population size and geographical location suggest that Australia is a 
more realistic 1'ront-runner for cooparative purposes. 
Portuguese advances toward the R:1.ver Plate led to the creation of a new 
Spanish Viceroyalty 1n R.lenos Aires 1n 1776. At least since then a certain 
geopolitical and econanic rivalry has been perceived by many observers between 
the camunities which today make up Argentina and Brazil. For the last fifty 
years or so Brazil has been catching up with Argentine per capita 1ncane, 




or the three countries considered in this essay, Brazil is the oldest 
one, economically speaking. By the middle of the nineteenth century Brazil 
had already.experienced a rich econom1.c history characterized by export~ 
leaving behind, besides splendid architecture, little but institutional arTal"lge­
ments 1.nim1cal to development. 'lhe 17th century sugar boan of the Northeast 
yielded slavery and latifundia, plus a peripheral low-productivity subsistence 
sector. The 18th century gold boom may have contributed to Brazilian national 
union, but its impact on sustainable per capita 1ncanes was weak. 'lbe rela­
tively painless way Brazil obtained independence during the 1820s could have 
been expected to facilitate the spread of the industrial revolution to the 
tropics, but by the mid-nineteenth century Brazil remained a patriarchal rural 
society, its labor market shackled by the peculiar institution. In contrast 
with Argentina, however, the Brazilian state by 1850 had becane a going concern 
relying on reasonably finn institutions. At that tine Cl'lly Chile in I.atin 
.Anerica could match Brazilian institutional devel~nt. 'lbe Brazilian geo­
graphical vastness and the heterogeneity of its regional economies made the 
political achievements of the Brazilian m:marchy the m:>re jmpressive,El.lthough am­
biguous regarding their impact on econanic development. Reflecti.M perhaps certain 
faith 1n its manifest destiny, that state called itself an enpire. 
O'le may conjecture that Argentine per capita incare at mid-nineteenth 
century was not far above the low Brazilian levels; by then, however, slavery 
had dissolved in the River Plate leaving practically no 1npr1nt either ethnically 
or culturally. D..lenos Aires had cane into its own only late in the 18th century 
as a result of the Bourba"l. refonns; other parts of what was to becane the 
Argentine Republic had "looger" economic histories, but mainly as peripheries 
to the mining centers of the Perus (including today's Bolivia). In 1861 
Argentina was m::,rc of an en;,ty land than Brazil. 'lllis eq,tiness was regarded 
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both as a key barrier to econan:1.c progress and a potentially fatal geopolitical 
naw; Argentine leadership was to be marked by a conpulsion to "people the 
wilde1ness" with little regard for delicate benefit-cost calculations. Before 
the 1860s what is today the Argentine Republic was made up of fragile coalitions 
of regional authorites, jealous of their autonCII\V, and which could have gone 
their separate ways as in Central America. Perceived threats from the North 
and the West, plus the growing econanic hegenony of Buenos Aires contributed 
to establishing national unity, a unity which may be Viewed as a precondition 
for the rational exploitation of Panpean land. 
D..lr1ng the nineteenth century Australia was far behind both Argentina 
and Brazil 1r: the development of sovereign political institutions. The 
Australian colonies did not becane a federation until 1901; that federation 
appeared to have less centralized control than those of Argentina and Brazil. 
Colonial status did not prevent Australia from achieving one of the highest 
per capita incomes and substantial 1ndustr1aliza.tion in the nineteenth century, 
as w1l1 be seen below. 
CKle interesting am little-known aspect of the pre-1860 period in 
Latin .America is the early industrialization efforts: which sanet:1mes involved 
goveninent support, either Via tariffs or subsidies. Mythology makes Rosas 
with his 1832 Tariff an early industrializer 1n Argentina,and sanewhat later the 
Baron of Maua undertook ant>itious projects 1n Brazil. Portales in Chile, and 
Francia and the two Lopez 1n Paraguay are even clearer exanples of conservative/ 
protectionists of the early nineteenth century, paradoxically rediscovered and 
glor1f'led in recent years by sare neo-Marxian autl'x:>rs, and by nationalist 
historians. These early efforts at policy-induced inport substitution failed. 
The reasons ror such f'ailures have not been well documented, except for the 
tragic Paraguayan experiment, which was bloodily crushed by the Triple Alliance 
. . 
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of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay 1n the 1860s. 'nle sharp decline 1n ocean 
i're1ghts plus the British technological lead made cal1)etition with inported 
manu.factl.lI'6S . very difficult. 
3. THE BELIE EPOQUE (1860-1929) 
'lbe export oriented growth ma.de possible by an expanding international 
econorey raised per capita inc~ in a sustained and substantial. way in Argentina 
since about the 1860s and in Brazil since the beginning of this century. 'lbe 
vigorous sao Paulo coffee boom of late nineteenth century was largely offset 
by the decline of other Brazilian export activities, such as sugar and cotton; 
in the River Plate the expanding export lines m,re clearly offset from an 
earlier period those in decadence, such as salted meat. The Argentine export 
quantum rose at a remarkable 4.8 percent per annum fran 1865 to 1912, and at 
4. l percent per anmm1 fran 1912 to 1928 (rn.Jguez, 1972). 'lhe expansion of the 
Australian export quantum reached 4.3 per annum during 1870-1913 (Maddison, 
1979, p.26). 
Table l presents estimates of~ capita Gross Ibnestic Product (GDP) for 
Argent1na,Austral1a, and Brazil. Brazilian~ capita GDP grot.th could not have 
been very s1€1df1cant during the 19th century,given its 1901 level;the Table suggests 
significant Argentina~ capita growth even before 1880. Australia,in contrast was 
born r1ch;th1s point is ot'ten forgotten in cooparing Argentina and Australia. Vast 
mineral resources and scanty population make the Australia of the second half 
of the nineteenth century conparable to sane Persian Gulf nations of today, or 
to sane mining states in the West of the United States also in the nineteenth 
century. As far back as 1861-65, Australian agriculture, livestock, dairying 
and fisheries contributed only 22 percent of value added 1n the econaey; mining 
and manufacturing together acco'Wlted for 19 percent, and construction 9 percent. 
(attlln, 1962). Che may conjecture that value added 1n agriculture and livestock 
f ' . . 
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'TABLE 1 
Estimates of Argentine, Australian and Brazilian 
Per Capita Gross ~stic Product 
(In U.S. dollars, of 1970-purchasing power) 
Argentina Australia Brazil 
1880 ,$470 _$1520 _$139 
1901 780 1360 190 
1973 2049 3723 
1913 1030 1690 230 
1928 1200· 1590 340 
1939 1170 1670 430 
1945 1280 1940 470 
1955 1380 2340 670 
1970 1960 3470 1100 
1459 
1980 2184, !1022 1924 
Sources and rrethod: Est1mates have gone backward and forward, centered 
on the calculations for 1970 found 1n Kravis ~ al (1978). Argentine 
data on per capita growth since 1900 obtained fran n!az Alejandro (1970); 
CEPAL (1978); and International Monetary Fund (1981). Brazilian data 
s11"lce 1900 obt.::i1ned f'ran F.addad (1980) and L"l.tematiaial Monetary Fund 
(1981). Australian data obtained fi'orn Butlin (1962), Butl:in (1977) and 
International Monetary Fund (1981) • Argent:ine and Brazilian estimates 
.for 1880 are rough guesses based ·on export quantum data. Data on 
Argentine e:xport quant\Jtl are the revised series found in Di~z (1972). 
. . 
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in Argentina and Brazil during 1861-65 m.ist have accounted for no less than 40 
percent of GDP. 
'1he remarkable catching up of both Argentine population and rer capita 
product relative to Australian ones up to the late 1920s is hie-,hlighted in 
Tables 2 and 3. Brazil also advances 1n per capita product but at quite a 
distance fran the two tenperate countries of recent settlement. Australia 
appears to stagnate for surprisingly long periods; the aggregate figures, 
however, hide an inJ)ressive diversification f'rorn a rich but specialized mining 
and rural econorcy into a m:xiern industrialized country. Australia also suf­
fered unusually harsh weather dtll"1.ng the 1890s. 
Of the three countries, pre-1929 Argentina appears to have had the roore 
adaptable and diversified export bill. Iur1ng 1875-79 Argentine exports were 
still largely made up by wool, hides, and salted neat. By 1890-94 wheat had 
becone a leading item; by 1900-04 both corn and linseed had becane (each) as 
inportant as hides; and by 1910-14 f'rozen beef exports were about as inportant 
as wool. Wool, hides and salted meat by 1910-14 anounted to only one-fourth 
of the value of merchandise exports. In contrast, the coffee share in Brazilian 
exports advaT1c-ed secularly since the last centU.."""J, so by the late 1920s Brazil 
had becooe one of the classic exan;>les of export concentration. Much of this 
contrast is explained by different natural endowments; Brazilian efforts since 
1906 to support international coffee prices plus other policies may have reinforced 
the trend. Wool remained the leading Australian export, representing 54 percent 
of all exports during the 1880s and 43 percent during the 1920s (Boemi, 1979, 
p .151). Gold plus mineral exports accounted for 27 percent of exports 1n the 
1880s and 9 percent during the 1920s; between those two decades the wheat share 
in Australian exports rose frail 5 to 21 percent. 
'lhe ratio of exports to danestic product remained lower 1n Brazil than 
.1n Argentina: during 1925-29 it was about 14 percent for the former and 24 
'' ' ,·' 
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,TABIE 2 
,Estimates of Argentine, Australian and Brazilian Populations 
(Millions) 
Argentina .Australia Brazil 
!861 1.35 1.20 8.55 
1880 2.147 2.21+ 11.55 
1901 1+.92 3.83 18.39 
1913 7.60 4.75 23.66 
1928 11.28 6.22 32.23 
1939 13.95 1.03 40.29 
1945 15.39 7.58 46.22 
1955 18.89 9.12 60.18 
1970 23.75 12,51 92.52 
1973 24.72 13.38 100.56 
1980 27.06 14.62 123.03 
Sources: As in Table 1 plus national statistical sources; United Nations, 
Demographic Yearbook, several issues; and IMF, International Financial 





Argentine and Brazilian GDP and Population relative to Australia 
,(Australia• 100) 
Per capita GDP Population 
Argentina Brazil ~ntina Brazil 
1861 113 713 
1880 31 1109 525 
1901 57 14 128 480 
1913 61 14 160 518 
1928 75 21 198 573 
1939 70 26 203 610 
1945 66 24 203 610 
1955 59 29 207 664 
1970 56 32 190 740 
1973 55 39 185 752 
1980 54 48 185 842 
Sources: Tables land 2 
• 
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percent for the latter (data obtained f'ran Haddad 1980 and D!.az Alejandro 1970). 
'Ihe Argentine growth locanntive had less of a low productivity subsistence 
sector to drae along than the Brazilian one. 'Ihe corresponding Australian 
ratio was 18. percent (Butl:1n 1962), sanewhat lower than the Argentine number 
:1n spite of a lower Australian population and lack of a s1r,n:1.f1cant Australian 
subsistence sector. A higher Australian per capita :1ncare, a nx:>re diversified 
productive structure, and differences in danestic relative price structures 
rna.v help to explain that contrast. 
'Ihe socioeconomic linJr..ages of Australian exports, one may conjecture, 
were nore desirable for loog term econan1c and political develoµnent than those 
of Argentina, in spite of the apparently m:>re diversified Argentine export 
bill. Gold and mineral exports relied on economic agents and forms of production 
sharply different :f'ran those :involved in rural exports; the Argentine export 
bill did not ccntain such a significant counterpoise to rural exports. Australian 
mining exports seem to have had powerful forward and backward industrial linkages; 
generated interest :1n scientific and technical research;gave rise to a labor 
force which rapidly forned trade unions not ooly in m1n1ng but also among 
ranch hands; and those trade uni.ens as well as entrepreneurs involved with 
min:1ng coalesced :into political groups opposing the creation of a permanent 
landowning class (Hirst, 1979, pp. 87-88 and pp. 110-112; Gallo, 1979, pp.66-67). 
We now turn to an exam1.naticn of the inputs of land, labor, capital and technology 
feeding the export locaootives, as well as of those other goods and services 
generated by the pre-1929 eca,anies. But first a few words on the institutional 
.f'ranework within which eca,anic variables q,erated. 
Apolitical and social framework 0all)at1ble with export-or1ented growth had 
been settled 1n Argent:1na since shortly af'ter the middle of the nineteenth century. 
M111tary C8lll)~s expanded southward the geographical dana.1n of the Argent:1ne 
Pepublic during 1879-80,at the expense of 1nd1ans' and Chilean claims; Chile at 
that time was engaged :1n a war against Bolivia and Peru. Brazil had sane 
. . 
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inportant evolutionary changes to make in its institutiooal organization as late 
as the 1880s and 1890s, when slavery was abolished and the erll)ire becane a 
republic. Australia gradually evolved toward self-rule, but retained strong 
ties to the British crown. '!he external franework for all countries was that 
of the Pax Britannica until the First World War. Both internal and external 
frameworks being on the whole secure and satisfactory to hegemonic social forces, 
little public intervention was deemed necessary in the day-to-day operation of 
Argentine markets for outputs and inputs. 'Ihe Brazilian state tended to have 
a nnre interventionist stance than the Argentine one, due partly to the 
requirements of an orderly abolishnent of slavery. Brazilian tariffs were 
higher on average tha.'1 Argentine ones and the Brazilian ccmn1'tm:!nt to the gold 
standan:1 was shakier. Both countries, however, would frequently follow financial 
policies \\tu.ch foreign bankers would find appalling. 'Ihe Brazilian republic 
was inaugurated with an enthusiastic burst of credit expansion; the Argentine 
also frequently noated its currency, a practice then disparagingly labelled 
the inconvertible paper standan:1. In spite of declarations of econcmic liberalism, 
provincial and national publicly-owned banlr.s expanded 1n the late nineteenth 
century 1n Argentina. Influential landowners appear to have been the major 
beneficiaries of such departures f'ran laissez-faire. Protectionism was the 
I1Dst noticeable Australian departure from pre-1929 orthodoxy regarding rules of 
the gar.e for international economic relations. 
Both Argentina and Brazil had arrple supplies of raw land to generate their 
land-intensive exports. 'Ihe supplies were anple but not perfectly elastic: 
the upward tilt in the supply of econanically honDgeneous land was enough to 
generate large rents for intra-ma:rg:lnal landowners. Both oo ! priori grounds and 
on the basis of available infonna.tia,, one may cooclude that Panpean landowners 
were the major beneficiaries of the great Argentine expansion up to the 1930s. 
By 1880 the best Panpean land had been appropriated in a manner leading to a 
coocentrated pattern of land ownership. Chee real estate had thus been distributed, 
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an open and carpetitive land market was not at all inconpatible with spectacular 
rents falling into relatively few hands. 1tfu1le the Brazilian case is roore 
conplex due to its regional heterogeneity, similar conclusions seem to 
apply. Experirrents with colonization schemes centered around family-owned farms 
were caITied out in sorre regions of Argentina and Brazil. 'Iheir beneficial 
socioeconomic consequences, unfortunately atypical for those countries as 
a whole, can be seen 1n the Argentine province of Santa Fe and the.Brazilian 
state of Santa Catarina. In both .Argentina and Brazil landowners, particularly 
those producing exportable goods, beca.ITE the m::>st powerful pre-1929 political 
actors, and had the m::>st to say as to how newly-available land was to be 
distributed. 
Australian land policies present a substantial contrast to those of the 
Argentine. For many years the Br1tish Crown did not surrender ownership of 
Australian land; sheep ranchers failed to get clear titles to their enonoous 
enterprises during the crucial fonna.tive years of Australia (Gallo, 1979, 
pp. 100-102). ~position to the land ,claims of sheep ranchers came fran miners 
and urban groups; ranchers remained an 1nportant political force in Australia, 
but me which did not control the governmental machinery as landowning groups 
did in Argentina (Hirst, 1979, pp. 83-84). When cereals became an inportant 
Australian export, family-operated nedilml-size fanns "'7re relatively m::>re 
inportant than in Argentina, where tenant fanning under contracts of about five 
years were m::>re widespread than in Australia. A system of rural production where 
tenant farriers m::>ved frequently from me region to another apparently was not 
harmful for Argentine rural productivity and output growth before 1929, but had 
deleterious effects ai incaie distributiai as well as a, social and political 
life. 'Ille nediocre housing, poor social services and lamentable infrastructural 
facilities in most of the nelancholy little towns scattered across the Panpean 
r.cne were eloquent testinaly to the rootlessness or Argentine fanning and the 
weakness of the rural middle class. Landless tenant farmers had difficulty in 
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obtaining credit and securing marketing arrangements which they perceived as 
stable and fair. 
With the pattern of land Olll'lership given by political history,· and with 
prices of exports, irrports and capital given fundamentally by intematiooal 
markets, total rents depended on the cooditioos of labor supply. Imnigration 
policy becaJ'IE the critical policy variable under the control of pre-1929 
Australian, Argent:1ne and Brazilian governments, in the sense that public 
action could have an irrportant influence on the levels of migration, and that 
in tum had powerful effects on the growth and distribution of GDP. 
'lbe pre-1929 world witnessed massive migrations, but the "international 
labor market" remained se~nted by culture, policy and prejudice. Chinese 
and Indians migrated, but mainly to tropical regioos, Northwestern Europeans 
moved mainly to North America, Australia and South Africa. Argentina and 
Brazil (or one should say Sao Paulo} camected primarily with the labor markets 
of Southern Europe. 01.ly via the Italian labor market were there significant 
indirect links with the broader Atlantic labor market; Italian migrants m:.:>ving 
back and forth between Santos and Buenos Aires also linked, but weakly, the 
Argentine and the Brazilian labor markets. Australia, :1n cootrast, 11m:1.ted its 
connections with Northwest Europe, primarily the Br1tish Isles. While 1 t 1s 
not obvious that real w-ages 1n IIi::land were above those in I.aribar-dy towa.i~ the 
end of the nineteenth century, it is likely that oo average real wages were 
higher in Northwest Europe than in Italy and Spain. Fln:tgrants from the fonner 
area also had the choice of migrating to the United States or the white daninioos, 
a choice often made by Italians but not by Spaniards. Ch balance, the m::,re 
restrictive A~trallan imnigration policy placed a higher noor under Australian 
wages. 'lhis species of labor protectionism probably had a greater inportance 
for the welfare of workers within Australia than the celebrated Australian tariff. 
But for excluded migrants the contellplation of advanced Australian social 
legislation m.1St have been a small consolation. 
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Argentine and Brazilian landowners favored and were able to obtain 100re 
open 1nm1gration policies. '!he Brazilian case is particularly interesting: 
after abolition of slavery in the 1880s a large pool of cheap labor existed within 
the country, _yet Sao Paulo landowners pressured their state goven-11ent to seek 
imnigrants rran Southern Europe and even Japan. Such migration was subsidized. 
Internal migration into Sao Paulo remained surprisingly small until the 1920s. 
'Ille Sao Paulo landowners had transitional troubles deal1ng with free labor 
not only in the case of ex-slaves; the Italian govemmant early this century 
tenporarily banned subsidized emigration to ffa.o Paulo after receiving reports 
of deception and mistreatnent of migrants. 
Migra.tioo into Argentina required fewer, if any, subsidies. '!be country, 
with a population of 2.5 millioo in 1880, received 3.2 million 1m:n1grants 
during 1880-1910, roore than eighty percent caning from Italy and Spain. '!he 
architects of the Argentine liberal program had hoped for 1nm1grat1on from 
· Northwest Europe, and .f'raned post-1860 Argentine laws, including religious 
tolerance, to accoom::>date them. Sane came, but Argentina was to remain pre­
dan1nantly La.tin. Of all 1m:n1grants who came, about two-thirds sta_yed. While 
P..rgenti.rie popu1Atioo 1..11c_-r-eased by 5.1 million between 1880 and 1913j that for 
Australia rose only by 2. 5 million. Under the influence of the interests of 
landowners and the urge to"people the wilderness," Argentina took many of the 
gains ar1s1ng rran export-led growth in the fonn of higher populatioo; the 
labo:r-1nfluenced Australian govennent "chose" to maintain a sa?ewhat stagnant 
high per capita inCCll'E and a low, h<m:>geneous population. Cne may note that 
neither Australia nor Argentina received significant n\lllbers of non-white 
imnigrants;aane Japanese migrants went to Argentina, but m?"e went to Brazil. 
Internal migration in Argentina, as in the Brazilian case, was surprisingly 
sluggish until the 1930s; it appeared easier during sane of the pre-1929 ~an 
harvests to bring seasooal. workers !ran Italy than frail northern Argentine 
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provinces, which contained substantial pools or workers earning wages below 
those luring Italians ·to the Panpas. '!he coexistence of massive 1mnigration 
with persistent pools of darestic cheap (or cheaper) labor :1n both .Argentina 
and Brazil, as :1n the case of the Ulited States of those days, indicates 
that darestic labor markets were also se~nted by culture and prejudice, and 
perhaps also by policy. 
'lhe contrasting Australian and Argentine international migration policies 
may be ccnpared to hows~ United States universities handle admissions to 
their graduate econanics programs. University Y attenpts to screen applicants 
care.fully, and once a,e 1s admitted he or she can practically be sure of 
financial and pedagogic support for four years, alrrDst independently of per­
.fonnance. University X flings its doors open but relies C11 canpetitive exams 
to detennine who will stay and be supported after the first or secaid year. 
'lhe atnosphere and feelings of belonging and loyalty among students at University 
Y are likely to present a m:>re attractive picture than at University X. First 
year students at University X, like jmnigrants into pre-1929 Argentina, will 
not rush into "citizenship" nor will quickly join the "Arrey." But if me could 
place all potential students (1mnigrants) behind a "veil of ignorance" regarding 
their prospects of admission, me will end up with different~~ opinions 
regarding optimJm admission policies. 
While apparently not nuch was done 1n either Argentina or Brazil to 
select imn:1grants on the basis of their skills, pre-1929 .Argentina engaged :1n 
inportant educatialal efforts, particularly at the level of primary education. 
'!he Argentine illiteracy rate, calculated as a percentage of the populatioo 
.fourteen years of age and older, dropped rran 77 percent according to the 1869 
census to 36 percent 1n the 1914 census. In 1920, ccrrparable Brazilian illiteracy 
remained around 65 percent. 
'lhe pre-1929 danestic capital markets of Argentina, Australia, and Brazil 
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became closely interwoven with those 1n &lrcpe, especially I.aldcn, and later 
with that 1n New York. With cyclical ups and downs, savings generated both 
danestically and abroad were transfo:rned into railroads, land ~rove!IV!nts, 
houses, factories and social overhead capital. '!he presence of fore1@11 capital 
was relatively ·1arger 1n Argentina and Australia than Brazil. Jt has been 
estimated that the stock of long-term foreign 1nvestnent 1n Argentina 1n 1913 
was only 18 percent lower than the equivalent figure for Canada; by 1930 
Argentina accounted for 12 percent of all British long-tenn investments overseas, 
while Canada accounted for 14 percent and Australia for 13 percent. Argentine · 
creditworthiness,as reasured by the market yield of her bonds, was not very dif­
ferent from those of Australia and Canada during the 1920s. As late as 1931 Argen­
tina was able to roll over a loan at an interest only 90 basis points above the 
average rate paid by the government of the United Kingdan; in 1927 Argentine 
creditworthiness was ranked by British experts as seventh among fore1@11 countries 
(Wortman, 1981). 
Associated with foreign capital, but less tightly packaged with it than 
in the 1950s and 1960s, cane foreign tecmology and lmowledge of various sorts. 
'1he tricks for running railroads and streetcars, reatpacking and electricity 
plants, refrigerated ships and coffee warehouses, were first provided by foreigners. 
'lhose tricks provided m:nopoly power, but of a wasting kind; too many people, 
including Argentines and Brazilians, could provide them sooner or later. In 
the neammile it is likely that 1.nportant quasi-rents were captured by fore1@11 
suppliers, feeding the debate as to whether foreigners were exploiting local 
residents. Note that nuch foreign capital was placed .1n activities which 
came close to being natural nr:nopolles or IOOl'lOpSonies. Railroad and public 
utilities were obvious eX8I1i)les; less clear-cut were neatpack:1ng, shipping and 
insurance. Note also that such near IIICl'lopolies (railroads) and DlCl'lopsonies 
(meat packers) had intimate camercial and financial links with other foreifgl 
caipanies, decreasing carpetitiveness not just .1n the nerkets for their principal 
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outputs and inputs, but also 1n a mat of other related markets. British-owned 
railroads and public utility catpanies 1n Argentina, are said to have bought 
coal, rails, and many of their other inputs exclusively fran British caipan.1es 
with which tl:)ey had camai financial interests, and also engaged in what today 
would be called intra-fiim transfer pricing (Fodor and O'Cn1nell, 1973,p.16). 
'!he fruits of technological progress generated in the leading industrial 
countries diffused into Argentina, Australia and Brazil via nunerous·other 
mechanisms, besides foreign investments. Imports of capital, intermediate and 
constmer goods embodied nuch of nineteenth and early twentieth century advances 
as well as dubious fashioos; migrants often carried in their hands and heads 
new knowledge; ideas m::>ved t'reely :1n nJagaz1nes and books eagerly sought :1n an 
age of faith :1n "progress." Exarq::>les of the latter with particularly bene­
ficial jnpact oo htmJal'l welfare included advances :1n medicine and public health, 
whose diffusioo also involved trips by students, researchers, and other skilled 
persamel. 
In both Argentina and Brazil the productioo of exportable goods were 
predan:1nantly in domestic hands, 1n contrast with say, Chile and Cuba, but at 
least during the nineteenth century their international marketing remained con­
trolled by foreigners to a large degree. Argent:1ne cattlemen generated signi­
ficant savings and did diversify their portfolios, but showed limited interest 
1n investing "downstream". 'lbey had actively changed livestock technology, 
steadily int>roving cattle herds, but made ally timid efforts to invest in 
meatpack1ng; Argentines were practically absent 1n the exporting of chilled meat 
( their presence was greater in f'l'ozen meat exports) • 'lhis behaVior caitrasts
I .with that of 1\.lcuman l.andawners, woo invested 1n sugar mills producing for 
danestic CCl'lSUDpticn. Cne _, CCl'ljecture that Argentine cattlemen let fore~rs 
handle intematiCl'lal marketing of their products as a way of insuring foreign 
IIU'kets• ftI7 IIILICh u sane countries rely ~ cri transnaticnal corporaticns 
tor marketing their eXPC>rts. A t'ew large trading ccmpanies danina.ted Argentine 
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grain exports; sane were started by Argentine entrepreneurs and quickly became 
intematiooal cai;,anies. Brazilian coffee-growers si~ficantly expanded 
their marketing activities since the begirm:1ng of this century. 
Uneasiness about the presence of foreign capital was only of the anxieties 
generated by the pre-1929 export-led growth m:>del. Industrial activities had 
advanced :1n both Argentina and Brazil, but not enough according to sane critics, 
including scme :1n the Anned Forces, who associated :industrialization w1th mili­
tary strength and national greatness. As already noted, the Brazilian tariff 
seems to have been nDre protectionist than the Argentine one, according to 
average levels at least. Both countries relied heavily on manufactured ~rts; 
machinery and equiIJDent requirements were a.lmst totally supplied rran abroad. 
In the case of Argentina even textiles were predaninantly of foreign or1g:1n; 
the Argentine textile :industry curiously lagged behind those of Australia, 
Brazil and Mexico. Australian industrialization was encouraged not Cl'lly by 
linkages .fraT1 mineral exports but also by tariffs and other explicit govermient 
support. Austrialian econanic historians disagree as to whether those policies 
advanced or retarded pre-1929 Aust.."'"cilia.11 develoi::,ment; sane view protection as 
a wasteful luxury this early Kuwait could afford. 
Camiercial and exchange-rate policies were debated :1n Argentina, Aus­
tralia, and Brazil with the usual arguments and by the standard actors at least 
since the seCCl'ld half of the nineteenth century. As suggested previously, the 
la,g run develOJXl)ental and distributional consequences of the debated policy 
ranges were probably less than those for migration policies, which gave rise 
to less debate and which have :received less scholarl.v attention. 'nle standard 
scenario naturally places landowners on the side or free trade, where one also 
finds the Argentine socialist party, but not the Australian labor party. It 
has also been argued that 1n both Argentina and Brazil producers of exportable 
goods favored nexible exchange rates whenever international prices of those 
carmxiities·were falling, while favoring a return to the gold standard, as a 
check to appreciation, whenever world prices turned 1n their favor. Importers 
of goods.and services also favored free trade but preferred an appreciated and 
stable currency. Am:mg major ~rters of services one may place central govern-
. ments ha.Ving to service their external debt. '!he government also had to worry 
about raising revenues in local currency and found inport duties an expedient 
mechanism for doing so. Landowners may not have been too displeased with 
rocxierate duties, as otherwise fiscal revenues may have had to caie from land 
and other property taxes. Meroories of abusive use of the innation tax during 
the 1880s and 1890s 1n both Argentina and Brazil provided political support for 
the gold standard during the first three decades of this century; the Argentine 
socialist party was an eloquent defender not mly of free trade but also of 
price stability and the gold standard. c:ne may also note that regional interests 
and politics :in both Argentina and Brazil rnay explain the adoption of SOOE 
protective tariffs. 
Even if one considers landowners as the daninant innuence on Argentine 
and Brazilian public policy, therefore, their enthusiasm for ca?pletely free 
trade and nexible currency arrangements had certain practical lim1ts. Note 
also that 1n Argentina the middle class Piadical party controlled the goveninent 
-during 1916-30; radical adm:1n1strations introduced (mild) social welfare 
measures and expanded state investments 1n petroleum and ra1lroads. 'lh1s has 
not prevented sane critics fran tightly associating export-oriented growth with 
a skewed incooe distributioo, oligarchical political daninance, a bias aga:inst 
.1ndustr1allzat1ai, and a masochistic dependence on foreigners, a canbination 




To conclude this section let us recaisider the relative Argentine position 
at the end of the Belle Epoque. As shown in Table 1, the late 1920s witnessed 
the narrowest gap between Argentine and Australian ~ capita incanes. But the 
gap remained:_ Argentine per capita incooe has never been ~r than that of 
Australia. Besides data in Table 1 other evidence supports this conclusion. 
~ capita Argentine exports were below those of Australia during 1_925-29; 
Argentine per capita apparent consurrption of cement was about sixty percent that 
of Australia in 1928-29; Argentine infant m:>rtality rates were twice as high as 
Australian ones during the 1920s, as reported by the League of Nations. The 
siz.e, glitter, and cultural excellence of the city of Buenos Aires in the 1920s, 
unmatched by any Australian city, may have misled many a casual ccmnentator on 
the Australian-Argentine conparison. It is m:>re revealing to contrast Buenos 
Aires glitter to Jujuy poverty or even to the well-fed err:ptiness of Panpean towns, 
a contrast not fol.md to the same extent in the m:>re equalitarlan Australia. 
4. ARJENTINA SLIPS: . 'lHE 1930s 'fflRCXJGH '!HE 1950s 
I:uring the 1920s the international econanic f'ramework characterized by 
a free-trading, cap1tal~xport1ng hegemonic power and by nwtilateralism in 
trade and paynents under the gold standard, so daninant before 191Li and so 
convenient for the Argentine growth nxxiel, had begun to show serious cracks. 
Latecarers to the industrial revolution, such as Gennany, Japan and the United 
States showed limited enthusiasm for British rules-of-the-game in international 
econanic affairs, and the oldhegenDn was unable to maintain clear leadership. 
Hints that pre-l91ZI nonna.lcy would never return came in the 1920s to Brazil 
(and to Chile and CUba) more forcefully than to Argentina, whose late 1920s 
~ capita exports were the highest (so far) this century. '!he hints turned 
into blinding red signals in 1929-1932. n.tr1ng the 1930s, the 1940s and well 
. into the 1950s, 1ntematiCl'l8.l. eccnanic relations witnessed nakedly mercantilistic 
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restricticns to trade and Nnancial nows, breached or lifted ma1.nl.y by arduous 
political maneuverlng and the establisl1nent of special patra1-client relation­
ships. Pre-1929 .Argentine ecooan1.c and political history had proVided a 
s1.ngularly poor preparation for facing this new dismal international environment. 
Before tunung to the gloaey task of chronicling Argentine slippage a reView of 
the international links, attitudes, and perceptions generated by pre-1929 
experience and harJt>ering adjustment to post-1929 reality is necessary. 
At least since the first Panamerican conference in 1889, Argentine foreim 
policy had clashed with that of the United States. Argentina came to view 
herself as the other major power in the Western Hanisphere, one whose stra,g 
econanic and cultural links to Europe and whose desire for an independent 
stand in intematialal affairs, made her skeptical of u.s.-sponsored Pan­
americanism. Iuring the early decades of this "American Century" both Right 
and Left 1n Argentina criticized United States intervention in the Caribbean 
and Central America, and it was an Argentine Foreign Minister who proclaimed the 
"calve doctrine" against the extratem.torial pretensicns of direct foreign 
investors, whether fran Europe or the United States. In spite of her close 
ecaxrn:1.c ties with the United Kingdan, /u""'gentina r-ema.L,ed strictly neut?-al 
during the First World War, and voiced opposition to the harsh tenns in;>osed 
ai Germany by the T.reaty of Versailles. Argentina becane an active and 
respected nenber of the league of Nations, adopting what toda_y would be called 
a "~" stance, much JOOre so than either Australia or Brazil. 
By the 1920s Argentine trade and payments had developed a "triangular 
pattem" (enphasized especially by Fodor and O'Coonell, 1973) of minor CCl'l­
aequence 1n a world of convertibility and nw.tilateralism, but run of dif­
ficulties Cl'lce the international ecaianic system drifted~ rran those 
principles. Argent1ne--merchandise trade sh'Jwed surpluses with the ttlited 
K1ngdan (and F.lll"Ope Jll)?"e generally) and deficits with the ttlited States. 
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Argentine grain exports caq:,eted with those of the United States; hopes that 
Argentina would becane a major supplier of meat to the United States were 
dashed by the adoption in 1926 of a United States ban oo fresh or frozen 
meat inports fran areas with hoof-and-mouth disease. 'nlis measure created new 
friction in Argentine-United States relations. AB the United K1ngdan lost its 
industrial dynamism, Argentine inporters tunied to the United States for new 
goods; to paraphrase a 1920s slogan, Argentina was increasingly buying fran 
those that did not buy fran her. 
'Ihe UK-US rivalry in the 1920s for the Argentine market is symbolized 
by the coopetition between the old railroads and the new rooter vehicles. The 
fonner were mainly British, carried linkages to British exports such as 
rails and coal, and generated profits and interest on old Br1tish investments 
(but produced meager fresh capital inflows during the 1920s). Auta?Dbiles, 
trucks, and tractors were predan:1nantly a United States export, and their 
linkages to tires, oil refining, and cement for road building were also danina.ted 
by United States interests, capable of providing new capital inflows. Other 
traditional British exports to Argentina, such as textiles, were also under 
strong coopetitive pressure during the 1920s fran both other exporters, like 
Japan, and incipient import-substituting entrepreneurs in Argentina. 
'Ihe stock of British investments generated interest and profit remit­
tances which together with payments for other British services, such as 
shipping and insurance, were roughly ~le to the Argentine export surplus 
with the United Kingdan. Net inflows of capital cane during the 1920s ma1nly 
fran the ll'lited States, offsetting the Argentine 1.nport surplus with that 
country. When fresh capital nows disappeared 1n the 1930s, United States 
interests would bitterly catpla1n that Argentine authorities d1scrim1nated 
against inports rran the United States, diverting forei@n exchange to service 
old British capital and to purchase old-fashioned British goods (Salera, 1941). 
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Voracious world markets and prodigious Panpean fertility nade both 
demand and supply of Argentine exportables seem alnx:>st effortlessly and 
1nf1n1tely expandable at least until the First World War. '!hat "easy stage" 
of export growth had, of course, to evolve sooner or later into another 
where aggressive marketing had to replace passive waiting for the world to 
care to Argentina for foodstuffs, and where both public and private efforts 
had to increase land yiea.ds rather than relying oo the extension of the 
Panpean frontier to produce more exportables. 'lhat evolution had to ~ 
even if the Great Depression and the Second World War had not occurred; the 
transitioo would have been partly induced by market signals but would have 
also required m:>re active public policy in the international marketing of 
exportables (involving also support for danestic storage facilities) and in 
rural research and extension activities. SUch an evolution away from a 
laissez-faire export policy and toward greater government attention to 
and support for·the production of exportables has occurred at least since 
the 1920s in other major exporters of ten;>erate foodstuffs, like Australia, 
canada, Denmark and the United States. Note that a more difficult selling 
\. 
environment and the end of enpty lands in those colD'ltries did not induce then 
to tum 8JIIB.Y frorn exporting primary products. 
'lhe stoney international ecooanic and political enviroment of the 1930s 
Sld 1940s was to severely test not Just the .Argentine econaey but also its polity. 
Ulder the democratic govenments of the 1920s there were naws which opened the 
.my to practically W'linterrupted (since 1930) military presence and intervention 
Jn Argentine politics, and to governments lacking, except for brief periods, 
11.lfTiciently broad and deep dalestic confidence to patiently engage in the 
aubtle and cai;>licated international econanic and political maneuvers which were 
necessary to maintain substantial per rantta econanic growth during the 19305 and 
1940s. 
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MaJor chinks in the constitutional polity of the 1920s included seg,nents 
of the Right which never became reconciled with post-1916 cleaner electoral 
processes assuring political success for the middle-class P.a.dical party during 
1916-1930; 1nm1.grants who were 1nperfectly integrated into the national political 
and social ille; and poorly-educated landless rural workers who were politically 
manipulated by local bosses. '!he nondemocratic segJnents of the Argentine Right 
were probably :1nnuenced by events and ideological ferm:!nt occurring 1n France, 
Italy, and Spain, and quietly wa1ted (and prepared the wa_y) for "the hour of 
the sword". '1he Radical party failed to incorporate much imnigrant and working 
class support, whether urban or rural, and was weakened in the late 1920s by 
personality clashes aroong major leaders. 
'Ire 1930 military ~d'etat against the charismatic but senile Radical 
President H1p6lito Yrigoyen led to hybrid military-civilian caiservative regines 
during 1930-1943, characterized by various degrees of electoral fraud and 
repression; to the nationalist-populist Peronist regimes during 1943-55; fol­
lowed by attenpts to restore non-Peronist civilian rule 1.l'lder military tutelage 
during 1955-1966; then to outright military rule during 1966-1973; to a second 
brief Penntst era, 1973-1976; and f1nelly to a return to military rule since 
197£. 'Ihe secular trend has been toward greater instability, faster turnover 
of ecooomic policy makers, and a nr>re fra@;lented polity. 
A. 'lbe "Infan0us Decade" (1930-1943) 
'!he dismal trend was not obvious during 1930-1943, when hopes for renewed 
econanic and even political advances at times seemed justified. True enough, 
as shown 1n Table 1, ~ capita GDP fell sllghtly during the 1930s, perfonning 
worse than those of Australia and Brazil. 'lhe growth 1n Argentine and Australian 
GDPs was 1n fact identical between the late 1920s and the late 1930s (l. 7 percent 
per annum); Argentine population, however, grew at nearly 2 percent per annum 
during those years, while that of Australia grew at only 1.1 percent per anmm1. 
It can be argued that, given external circumstances the 1930s Argentine per­
fonnance, at least relative to Australia, was reasonably good. '!he external 
shock to Argentina was more severe than that received by Australia: the current 
dollar value of Argentine exports in 1928 was 57 percent higher than that of 
Australia; during 1930-34 it was only 7 percent higher; and by 1935-39 it was 
10 percent higher (Kelly, 1965,p.51). The volurre of exports ~ capita fran 
Australia increased by 9 percent in the second half of the thirties, CCIJ¥)ared 
with the first half, whereas in the case of Argentina it declined by 11 percent. 
Ruth K~lly concludes: 
"Although Argentina falls behind Australia•••its export performance
in the thirties, carpared with the rest of the world, may be coo-
. sidered satisfactory. Indeed, at the end of the period, it gave
rise to expressions of optimism caicem1ng the col.U"ltry's future 
prospects as one of the world's major exporters of agricultlll"al
products 11 (Kelly, 1965, p. 57) • 
Argentine exports were hurt not only by the sltmp, but also by the pro­
tectiausrn and the discriminatory practices adopted by the lhlted K1ngdan and 
other industriall~d col.U"ltries. '!he grand illusions of the Belle ~ue were 
shattered, and Argentina with her triangular trade and payments patterns f0tmd 
herself 1n a difficult bargain1ng positioo vis-a-vis the British enpire. 
Otherwise amiable Argentines can still go for each others'.throats wher'l dis-
cussing whether or not Argentina had realistic alternatives to the htmi111at1ng 
P.oca-Runciman treaty, signed in 1933 to ward off further British protectionism, 
particularly 1n meat. What is generally accepted is that such a treaty was not 
very different fran those 1.nposed by the Nazis on eastern European countries, 
and that a tougher Argentine barga1n1ng stance would have had to be accaupanied 
by substantial restructuring of Argentine political and ecooanic institutions 
(see also Salera, 1941, Chapter III). Ole may speculate that a Per6n 1n 1933 
would have made mre sense than 1n 1946,. at any rate, the lbca-Rmciman treaty 
. . 
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contributed to the spread of anti-British and pro-Gennan nat1ooal.1sm throughout 
Argentine society, including the~ Forces. 
It was noted earlier that before 1929 Argentine exports were a larger 
f'ra.ction of qDP than those 1n Australia or Brazil. '!he greater specialization 
of the .Argentine ecooaey made her nr,re vulnerable to the Great Depression; 
even her manufacturing sector relied heavily on the processing of exportable 
primary products. It is noteworthy, therefore, that the Argentine manufacturing 
sector grew between 1928-30 and 1937-39 at an annual rate of 3.1 percent, 
,while that of Australia grew at only 1.3 percent per annl.111 (futlin, 1962,p.461; 
Naciones Unidas, 1978, pp. 78-79). Sectors of Argentine manufacturing which had 
lagged before 1929, such as textiles, "caught up" during the 1930s. Argentine 
cement production grew at an astonishing annual rate of 16.1 percent between 
1928-29 and 1937-38; that of Australia grew at 1.6 percent per annum during the 
same nine years. Apparent cerrent consl.Jn1)tion (local production plus ilrports) 
rose during that period at 4.8 percent per annum 1n Argentina and 1.4 percent 
per annum in Australia (European Cement Association, 1967). Preferential 
treatnent of British industrial exports granted under the P.oca-Runciman treaty 
did not block an Argentine jnport-substituting industrialization during the 
1930s that was faster than that of Australia. 
Both Argentina and Brazil, after initial confusioo and hesitations, 
adopted durjng the early 1930s policies which, altoough primarily aimed at 
restoring balance of payments equilibrium and aiding 1nnuent1al producers of 
exportable goods, cootributed to recovery 1n general and 1ndustr1al.1zation in 
particular. 'lhese measures have been discussed elsewhere (D!az Alejandro 198Qa arld 
1981) • Here a,e 111\Y note that the Brazilian departure fran 1920s orthodoxy 
was bolder than that of Argentina, although the :remarkable Brazilian industrial 
C. . 
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growth during the 1930s, at least double that of the Argentine annual rate, 
ma.v also be explained by the lower share of manufacturing output associated 
with exportable productioo and the mre closed nature of the Brazilian econcxey 
at the start of the Great Depression. 
One may conclude that the Argentine slippage behind Australia d~ 
the 1930s was minor and due mre to external circlmlStances than to danestic 
policies. It may also be conjectured that the Argentine urge to "people the 
wilderness" had already cane into conflict with faster per capita growth during 
the 1920s, with both Argentine birth and imnigration rates rema.1n1ng above 
those of Australia; this was to rena1n the case into the 1940s. While birth 
rates in the Argentine Federal Cspital and the Province of Buenos Aires by 
the early 1940s were about those for the whole of Australia (less than 20 per 
Ithousand)., those for the poorer Provinces, such as Jujuy, Salta and Tuctm:1an 
were twice as high. Table 4 shows that ~ imnigration into Argentina during 
the 1920s reached nearly one million persons, mre than three times the corres­
ponding Australian figures; even during the 1930s Argentina witnessed signi­
f"icant net 1mn1.gration. 
Incane distribution trends during the 1930s are obscure, but softer 
demand for labor appears to have at least maintained larger differentials 1n 
pay between sldlled and noo-skilled labor in Argentina relative to Australia. 
Evidence m this point 1s presented in Table 5, which also provides a rough 
check m Argentine-Australian per capita incane caipariSCl'lS. Note, however., 
that Table 5 uses narket exchange rates (not purchasing power est1m:ltes) , 





Net Inmigration into Argentina and Australia 
('Ihousand persais during periods shown) 
.Argentina Australia 
1921-25 521 183 
1926-30 456 130 
1931-35 51 -11 
1936-40 131 43 
1941-45 53 8 
1946-50 505 353 
Sol.ll"ces: D1.recci6n Nacional de Estad!stica y Censos, Infonne 
I IDem::>grafico de la Republica .Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1956) p.28. 
Coomnwealth BJreau of Census and Statistics, Quarterly Surrmary 
of Australian Statistics (Canberra, December 1950), p.7. 




Wages per hour of Adult Male Workers 2 October 1936 
Buenos Aires Buenos AiresWage Rates 1n Wage Rates as Percentages
CUrrent U.S. cents of those 1n Sydney
Mechanical engineering:
Fitters and turners 0.264 60.6
Iron DDulders 0.261 65.9Patte.mrnakers 0.322 67.4
Laborers 0.163 51.7 
Building: Bricklayers and masons 0.245 46.8
Structural iron workers 0.236 65.7Concrete workers 0.245 68.2
carpenters and j o:mers 0.245 53.1Painters 0.248 53.8Pluni>ers 0.307 60.2
Electrical fitters 0.248 52.4
Laborers 0.172 47.9 
Furniture making: Gab:inet makers 0.276 64.5Upholsterers 0.276 64.5
French polishers 0.276 64.5 
Printing and bookbinding:
Hand conpositors 0.353 85.3Machine carpositiors o.488 104.3
Machine minders 0.310 74.9
Bookbinders 0.267 64.5
Laborers 0.190 62.1 
Food industries; Bakers 0.263 55.l 
Electric power distribution:
Electrical fitters 0.282 59.6Laborers 0.202 53.4 
Traru;port
Tram and buses, drivers 0.209 55.6
~m and buses, conductors 0.209 58.7
Cartage, ITl)tor dr1vers 0.301 74.9
Railroads, goods porters 0.193 57.6
Ra1.lroads, pennanent
way laborers 0.123 39.0 
local authorities, laborers 0.276 78.6 
Sinple average 0.257 62.5 
Sources: Basic data obtained t'ran Intematiaial Labor Organizatiai, Yearbookof Labor Statistics! 1937 (Geneva, 1937) p.162. To cawert data in localcurrency to tiilted tates cents, the following exchange rates were used:
.Argent1na:3.26·Pesos per U.S. dollar (average of inport and export rates)Australia: 3.96 U.S. dollars per Australian Pound 
I • 
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Por each of the major groups shown 1n Table 5, such as neehanical engineering 
and buildmg., the gap between &lenos Aires and Sydney wage rates appears 
greatest in the least sldlled category (laborers). It 1s also interesting that 
Al'gentine workers 1n printing and bookbinding had the highest relative wages; 
clJr1ng the late 1930s Buenos Aires was the undisputed publishing center of the 
~sh-speaking world, w1th substantial exports. 
'!he outbreak of the Second World War placed great pressures on the 
Argentine econc:irey and polity. Within a few nmths major European markets 
disappeared, while shipping difficulties curtailed both exports and imports. 
New distress was visited on the Argentine rural producers of exportables., 
especially cereals., forcing the conservative governnent to decree a freezing of 
rural rents. Beleaguered Britain could hardly supply Argentine needs of 
machinery, fuel and 1ntel'T!Ed1ate inputs (not to mention weapons), and paid 
far .Argentine supplies with inconvertible and low-yielding sterling.
;rn 1941 the conservative govemnent created the General Directorate of Military 
Factories, establishing the principle of military-run industries. 'lhe war
exacerbated div.1.sions within the gove~nt and Armed Forces between pro-Allied 
and pro-Axis factions; especially after 1941 the United States pressured 
~tina into joining Pan-American collective actions, a course repugnant 
to Argentine diplaratic traditions. Few Argentines wanted departures fran 
neutrality., and relations with the United States became tense, particularly as 
Brazilian-United States ties becane roore 1ntimate. Pennent within the Anned 
Forces grew, anq political groups maneuvered frantically against the discredited 
Ca1Bervative civ1l1an regime. A rnmt>er of accidents and circ1.1?1Stances (master­
tully narrat.ed by Potash, 1969) finally led to the ant>iguous ~d'etat-of 1943. 
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B. 'Ihe First Peronist era (1943-1955) 
'lbe absolute and relative decline of Argentine foreign trade which had 
begun in the 1930s accelerated during the Second World War and culm1.na.ted during 
the first Peroni.st era, in spite of the apparently favorable tern1S of trade 
for 1946-49, according to available data the best registered this century 
(Df.az Alejandro, 1980b,p.9). Per capita quantum indices for 1nports and 
exports are presented 1n Table 6 for Argent1na and Australia; as during the 
first thirty years of this century Argentina was a major capital in¥'>orter, 
the secular decline of imports is ~what greater than for exports. ('Ihe 
Argentine tentlS of trade during the whole period showed considerable nuctuations, 
but no significant long-term trend). Table 6 shows the sharp fall of~ 
capita inports during the Second World War, sharper for Argentina than for 
Australia, and a subsequent recovery; however, during 1950-54 Argentine~ 
capita inports were only slightly m::,re than one-third those registered during 
1925-29, and about two-thirds of the level for 1935-39. 'Ihe decline 1n the 
~ capita Argentine export quantum is continuous 1'rOin 1925-29 through 1950-5'4, 
when it reached its lowest point for this century; even during 1945-49 it was 
only half the 1925-29 level., by 1950-54 it was one-third of that level, and 
less than half of the ~ capita export quantum for 1935-39. Australian 
~ capita exports during 1945-54 do not perform brilliantly relative to their 
ravorable evolution during 1930-44, as rar as quantities are concemed, but 
there is no dramatic collapse, as registered 1n the Argentine case. Indeed, 
the quantitative dimensiais of the rise and fall of Argentine foreign trade 
DJJSt have few parallels 1n contenporary econanic hi.story; note that 1n 1950-Sll 
Argentine ~ capita inports and exports were less than half what they had 




Per capita Argentine and Australian Merchandise Imports 
and Exports, Quantum Indices
(1930-34 equal 100) 
Imports Exports 
Argent:1na Australia Argentina Australia 
881900-0!J 145 129 102 
1001905-09 198 138 118 
1011910-14 195 175 103 
1915-19 99 133 92 81 
1920-24 142 150 114 81 
1925-29 186 188 121 82 
1930-34 100 100 100 100 
1935-39 103 160 89 109 
1940-44 51 114 62 124 
1945-49 89 149 60 98 
1950-54 67 212 40 94 
44 1091955-59 69 197 
51 1371960-64 76 253 
55 1701965-69 66 331 
Sources: For 1930-34 and earlier years, Argentine trade data were obtained 
ft'ool Naciones Unidas, 1959, Part I, pp. 15, 110, and ll5. Argentine data 
for 1930-3!! and later years were obtained rran Naciones Unidas, 1976, p.27. 
Australian trade data obtained fran a.ttl1n, 1977; they refer to July-June 
years, i.e., 1900 would refer to 1900/01. Population data as 1n Table 2. 
-32-
Table 7 examines the relative decline or Argentine trade using 1nport 
data at current prices, and extends the cooparison to Brazil. 'lhe costs of 
Argentine neutrality during 1940-44 are again apparent. _ Arter a recovery 
during 1945-49, the Argentine relative position sinks again during 1950-54 
to alloost World War II levels. .Argentine ~ capita inports, which during 
1930-34 were more than five t:1mes those of Brazil, by 1950-54 were only twice 
Brazilian per capita 1nports, and less than one-third those of Australia. 
Wh:r did the decline in Argentine trade continue beyond the 1930s? 
'1be cOJll)arison with Australia, and even with Brazil, as well as other 
evidence regarding market shares for major Argentine exports, indicate 
that general world econanic conditions could not be blamed for the 
extraordinary Argentine perfonnance a.rter the Great Depression. Spe:cial 
circumstances, such as the droughts of the early 1950s, seem overwhe.J..ned 
by the quantitative climensions and persistence of long-tenn trends. 
'Ibe answer IJU.1St be sought 1n Argentine policies., which had the net result 
of giving low priority to the promotion of foreign trade. 
Relevant Argentine policies go beyond those manipulating paraEters 
affecting foreign trade. The world of the 1940s and early 1950s could 
not be-characterized as one with open and caipetitive intemational markets. 
Hot and cold wars, and an uncertain recovery from depression and war 
circumstances and mentalities, created international markets which were 
politicized and se~nted well into the 1950s. Buying and selling m 
those markets and cawerting currencies used 1n those transactions, de­
pended partly a1 political considerations. 'lhe Argentine vocation for 
an autCl'lCIIDus foreign policy made her highly suspect ana,g the Allies. 
especially by the United States, even before the 1943 coup d'etat. 
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TABLE 7 
Value of Per capita Ar:gentine and Brazilian Merchandise Inports, 
At CUrrent Dollar Prices, Relative to Australia 






1935-39 52 12 
1940-44 26 9 
1945-49 56 17 
1950-54 28 14 
1955-59 29 10 
1960-64 23 8 
1965-69 16 6 
1970-74 17 12 
1975-79 16 13 
Sources: Merchandise ~rts at current dollar prices and population 
obtained !'ran International Monetary F\md, International Financial 
Statistics, several issues, for 1950-80. For earlier periods the 
following sources were used: United Nations, Yearbook of International 
Trade Statistics_, several issues; United Nations, Deroographic Yearboo~, 
several issues. 
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As during the First World War, Argentine inports plumneted during 1940-44, 
mre than those of Australia and Brazil, countries Whose military a.]jgr1nent 
against .the Axis assured them a greater now of civilian goods, shipping 
services and a.rrnanents. 
f Neither the Argentine declaration of war on Germany in March 1945, 
I .nor the narrow yet stunning victory of General Juan D. Peron in clean elections 
1n February 1946, substantially in;:>roved Argentine-United States relations, which 
were to remain characterized by a great deal of mutual hostility until at 
least 1950. Unlike Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland, and even Franco's Spain, 
World War II neutrals which adapted to postwar political circumstances 
with agility, Argentina was to stick to her '"Ihird Position," incurring 
the wrath of innuential policymakers in the United States. 'Ihe tangled 
web of Argentine-United States relations before and after the end of 
the Secaid World War reads at t1mes like tragedy and at t1mes like farce 
(see Escu~,1981, and Macdonald, 1980) • What now seems clear is that 
such political climate llmited Argentine markets, e.g., the Economic 
Cooperation Administration adopted rran its inception a policy of preventing 
European procurenent with Marshall Plan dollars in Argentina, and limited 
or increased the cost to Argentina of supplies of fuel, intennediate 
and capital goods (Fodor, 1975), well into the late 1940s. It may be 
noted that Argentina not only refused. membership 1n the Intematiooa.1 
Emergency Food Council but also refused to join the Un1ted Natiais' 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the Food and Agriculture 
Organizatiai,not to nention the IntematiCl'lal M:rletary Fund and the World 
Bank. Argentina did join the United NatiCl'lS at its fowding in San 
Francisco, with the support of the Un1ted States during a brief spell of 
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rapprochement, but over obJecticris of the Soviet Ulion that the Argentine 
regime had been SYJli)athetic to the Nazis. Dln"1ng the early postwar years 
Argentina defiantly granted credits and exported foodstuffs to Portugal 
and Spain. 
'Ihe United Kingdom, which during the 1930s used ever:, ounce of its 
bargain1ng power to extract concessions frail Argentina, during the 1940s 
took a tolerant stance toward Argentine non-allgnment, perhaps having no 
realistic alternative (nuch of recent writings on United States hostility 
toward Argentina dtn"ing the 1940s originates 1n Britain, even as nuch 
of the analysis of the British squeeze on Argentina during the 1930s 
originated in the Un1ted States). 'Ihe halting British postwar recover:, 
aggravated the triangularity problems in Argentine trade and payments. 
Britain, and Europe as a whole, was willing to buy Argentine goods using 
their own currencies, but Argentina already had acc'LlllUlated large balances 
of those pieces of paper which could be used ool.y for llmited purposes 
in their countries of origin and not at all to buy goods in the United 
States. '1he failure of the British return to sterling convertibility, 
culminating in August 1947, sharply lowered the opportunity cost of 
Argentine sterling balances and the ~xpected value of possible future 
sterling earnings. 
In retrospect, difficulties in the intematicnal econaey during 
the late 1940s appear as minor inconveniences oo the road to about three 
decades of remarkable expansioo 1n world trade. a.it at the time a case 
could be made that they were a prelude to a new Great Depression or to 
World War m. Even if those catastrophes could be avoided, it was 
unclear whether the protectionist barriers built by industrialized countries · 
during the 1930s, particularly 1n protecting their agricultural sectors, 
would be s~ficantly relaxed ooce recovery was canpleted. For 
Argentina~ the pattern of agricultural protectionism coupled by SW"essive 
exporting of agricultural surpluses which had emerged in industrialized 
countries since the 1930s was particularly worriscr.e. 
Peronist reluctance to give high priority tot~ expansion of foreign 
trade, and to the production of exportable goods, conveniently meshed with its 
nationalist-populist ideology and its political inclination to reward supporters 
and punish opponents. Urban working class backinr; was consolidated by assuring 
plentiful and cheap foodstuffs (another magnet attracting European 1mn:1.grants 
during 19116-50), even if the exported share of rural output had to be reduced. 
A roore aggressive and optimistic marketing abroad of Argentine rural produce 
would have clashed with the cheap food policy. Passins:?; on favorable inter-
·,, 
national postwar prices to producers of rural exportable goods, allowing them 
to find on their own external suppliers for their input needs, and letting 
those producers make their own guesses as to the outlook for primary product 
markets., would have strengthened groups hostile to the Peronist reg:1.rre, e.g., 
rural landowners and old int>ort-e.xport houses. 'Ille revenues generated by the 
gove~nt's trading agency in control of exports and 1nt>orts helped to maintain 
post-1943 trends toward expansion of military pa..,vrolls, the construction of 
military bases and annarnent plants, as well as to underwrite an industrial 
development plan., plagued by mismanagement and corruption (Potash, 1980, pp.4-5 
and 62-63). Finally, nations which had imposed unequal ccmnercial treaties and 
discriminatory trading practices on Argentina during the 1930s (and which during 
the 1940s also engaged in state tradine to maintain their bargaining power) , 
as well as those Argentines who to Peroni.st eyes had collaborated with the 
unjust foreign powers, had weaker claims on Argentine public policies of the 




Both domestic political considerations and the bleak international 
political and economic outlook were probably involved 1n the Peron.1st neglect 
of rural research and extension services, at a time when other producers of 
temperate foodstuffs, notably the United States, were experiencing dramatic 
technological change in cereals, as a result of canbined public and private 
sectors' efforts. Memories of unsold grain mountains, used during the Second 
World War as emargency fuel, and of unusable sterling mountains, weakened 
proposals to raise Arr;entine rural yields, which were around United States 
levels during 1920-44, but which lagged behind thereafter, especially in com 
(n!az Alejandro, 1970, p.163 and p.194). 
The Argentine econaey boaned during 1946-48; favorable export prices 
and reserves accumulated during the war, not all inconvertible, may have led to 
a Peronist belief that there is''.nothing more elastic than the economy which 
everyone fears so much because no one understands it" (Hirsctrnan 1979, p.65). 
The 19117 census was taken during these euphoric times; conveniently a census 
was taken in-Australia the sane year. Table 8 shows the allocation of the 
economically active population in the two countries. One quarter of the Argentine 
labor force was still in the rural sector,· a share substantially higher than 
that for Australia. The gap 1n manufacturing is narrower. Although the two 
countries show profiles which are not too different, including the participation 
of wooen 1n the labor force, that for Australia indicates a higher ~ capita 
1ncone. 
'lbe censuses also show that the percentage of the total population 
living during 1947 1n cities of nx,re than one hundred thousand inhabitants was 
higher 1n Australia (51.4) than 1n Argentine (40.6). However, the largest 
Argentine urban agglaneration, Greater Buenos Aires, represented a higher share 
of the country's total population (29.0 percent) than that in Australia, the 
city or Sydney (19.6 percent). A large gap separated Greater Buenos Aires 
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TABLE 8 
Allocation of the Econanically Active Population, 1947 
Percentages of . Wc:men as Percentage
Total Economically of Population 1n 
Active Population Ea.ch cate~ry 
Argentina Australia .Argentina Australia 
Agriculture, forestry huntjng,fishing 25.2 15.6 5.4 4.9 
Mining, quarrying 0.5 1.7 1.6 1.1 
Manu!'acturing 22.1 25.0 28.2 22.8 
Construction 5.2 7.3 1.2 0.6 
Electricity, gas, water 0.5 1.0 4.6 5.8 
Ccmnerce 13.3 15.0 12.6 31.1 
Transport, storage,conmunication 6.0 9.2 3.2 9.6 
Services 21.3 17.9 43.4 47.1 
Activities not adequately described 3.1 7.3 11.0 25.7 
Unemployed 2.8 27.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 22.419.9 
Source: International Labor Organization, Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 
Geneva, several issues. Australian data exclude full-blooded aboriginals, 




from Rosario and Cordoba, the second and third largest Argentine cities, while 
Melbourne was close in population to Sydney. '1he third Australian city, Brisbane, 
had a share 1n total population (5.3 percent) similar to the canb1ned shares 
• I 
of Rosario and Cordoba in total Argentine population (data for this paragraph 
obtained fran United Nations, 1952, p.11 and p.213). 
In 1949 the Argentine postwar boan ~ to an end. P.eserves had been 
drawn down, international prices turned less favorable and dollar shortaee 
became extrenely severe: it was to be the first of postwar recessions induced 
by the need to contain balance-of-pa._vments deficits. Per capita imports and 
exports levels, as shown in Table 6, reached their lowest peace-time levels 
this century during 1950-54. Manufacturing output, which had Slll"ged during the 
early postwar years, after 1948 showed sharp fluctuations but a mediocre growth 
trend: between three-year averages centered ar01md 1943 and 1954, the annual 
growth rate of manufacturing was 2. 5 percent (Naciones Unidas, 1978). D::.xnestic 
industry was unable to fully make up for the steep decline in~ capita 
in:ports of manufactures. 'Ire fall in the ~ capita absorptioo of industrial 
ccmoodities involved a decline 1n both the cons~tion of consumer durable goods 
and investnent in machinery and equ1JJ11e?1t. Inport substitution 1n 1ntennediate 
and capital goods, as well as fuels, turned out to be very troublesome given 
the magn.1.tude of the collapse 1n foreign exchange earnings, the ambivalence 
toward foreign capital, and difficulties in obtaining foreign machinery and , 
equiprrent, especially during the late 1940s. Arr,entine foreigri policy had a 
nai-trivial price not crily in tenns of foregone exports, but also for import 
substitutia1 and the maintenance and ex:pansiai of social overhead capital, 
especiaJ.1¥ 1n electricity and transport. 
'lbe low priority given to exports and other Peronist policies had a 
sharp negative 1nt>act oo Panpean production of rural exportable goods, par­
ticularly cereals and linseed, whose ~ capita output in 1945-49 was 57 percent 
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of the 1935-39 level; during 1950-51' per capita production of cereals and 
linseed were ooly 46 percent of the 1935-39 level. Livestock.did better; 
as labor flowed out of Panpean areas that land-intensive activity actually 
had an incentive to expand, in spite of the overall Peronist policies 
toward exportable rural goods. Other rural activities selling overwheJ.minp;ly 
in the domestic market, as in the case of roost of those outside the Panpean 
area, experienced substantial expansion. Tak1ne; the aggregate of all rural 
activities, their~ capita production shows a decline of about 11 percent 
between 1935-44 and 1945-54. Australian rural perfonnance during those years 
is far from spectacular, but ~ capita rural production manages to remain 
roughly constant (Cooroonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1958, p.ll4). 
D.lr1.ng the early 1950s the Peronist administration realized that the 
economic strategy of the late 1940s contained erroneous asswnptions about the 
evolution of the international econany as well as inconsistencies am:>ng 
targets for growth, industrialization and the balance of payments. In 1950 
a loan was obtained from the U.S. Eximbank. Droughts during the early 1950s 
helped to make evident the decay in Panpean agriculture; in 1952 Argentina 
had to inport wheat. Steps were taken to encourage the production of exportables. 
But as indicated by Tables 6 and 7 the recovery of Argentine trade was to prove 
arduous and halting, while the slippage of Argentine E!:!' capita GDP behind 
that of Australia was to continue as shown in Table 3, albeit at a slower 
place than that registered between 1928 and 1955. 
5. A NATICN DIVIDED OOES NC1I' CA'roi UP, BtJl' GmWS 
Even if the steps undertaken to encourage foreign trade recovery, during 
the last years of the Pe~st administration and by following governments, had 
been successful in el1m1nat1ng or.sharply reducing policy-induced biases against 
productioo for export, the recovery of Panpean agricultlll'e would have probably 
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been less than dramatic. Estancia hands were unlikely to return to the fann 
Cl'lce they had seen Buenos Aires. '!he tractors, fertilizers and inproved seeds 
needed to replace them would take scxre time to be incorporated into production. 
Ch average, export incentives were larger during 1955-1973 than during 
the first postwar decade. fut the policy tilt favoring inport substitution 
and d1scr1m1nat1ng against exports, whether of rural or manufactured goods, 
which became substantial during the 1930s and extrene due to war circ'LITl.Stances 
and postwar Peronist policies, remained a feature of the Argentine econaey 
throughout 1955-1973. Argentine effective rates of protection rema.1ned anDng 
the highest in La.tin America. Furthennore, incentives to Panpean production 
and tb exports in general followed a saw-toothed pattern, d1rn1n1shing their 
power. Why did protectionism remain so strong after the first Peronist era, 
and wh.Y were atten:pts to encourage exports so weak and transient? 
By 1960 less than aie-fifth of the Argentine labor force was engaged 
in rural activities. 'lhe Panpean production of exportable goods absorbed only 
part of that labor force. Furthenoore, the majority of Argentines living 1n 
urban centers, whose budgets were inevitably damaged 1n the short-run by higher 
prices for cereas and beef, perceived Pmq:,ean producers not as Jeffersonian 
fanners but as oligarch1cal landlords, whose large properties had emerged 
practically unscathed f'ran the Peronist years. Unlike the situation in the· 
United 5-tates and Western Europe, the Argentine farm lobby could carmand 
scanty eootiooal appeal, yet was strong enough to veto measures such as land 
taxes, which'could have reconciled efficiency consideratiais to equity concerns. 
More than two decades of sheltered industrialization had created by 
the m1.d-l950s vested interests opposing reductiais in protectioo, interests which 
also derived support fran the persistence of export pessimism, still prevalent 
at that time throughout Latin America. Perhaps the mst powerful protectionist 
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lobby centered ~und the Anned Forces, wh:>se officers made up a good share 
of the executive ranks of state enterprises such as those producing steel 
and annarrents. Mem:>ries of weapon shortages during the second world war 
buttressed protectionist argLm'lents. 
Protectionism and hostility to Pampean rural producers, .then, were 
hardly lirnited to the Peronist 100vement. Neither was a strong nationalist 
stance toward foreign capital a Peronist nnnopoly; indeed, it is said that 
ooe of the factors contributing to the overthrow of General Peron
I 
in 1955 was 
the -iliscontent caused w1thin the Anned Forces by his negotiations w1th foreign 
oil canpanies. As with export incentives, post-1955 governments zig-zagged 
in their policies toward foreign capital, especially toward direct foreign 
inves~nt, but on balance foreign corporations were used as key instruments 
in expanding industrial production in consumer durables, intermediate and 
capital goods. It is a IOOOt point whether the nnnsters begotten by the coupling 
of protectionism and direct foreign inves~nt, such as the inchoate and 
spastic autom::>bile industry, were less of an econClllic error than the Peronist 
miscalculations of the late 1940s. As in other canparisons, the Australian 
reco:ro on this issue (especially regarding autanobiles) shows qualitative 
features similar to that of Argentina; it is only in the nnre limited quanti­
tative dimensions of misallocation that Australia emerges 1n a favorable.light. 
'lbroughout 1955-1973 econanic policy was conducted in a turbulent 
political atlJDsphere. '!he exiled General PeronI maintained a large following, 
and trade unions were dominated by Peronists. No other single group emerged 
to challenge Peralism as the largest coalition 1n Argentine political life; 
the old P.adical party split, while conservatives and right-wing nationalists 
preferred to rely oo favorite Generals to advance their political designs. 
. r' ' 
ElectiCl'lS were sporadically held, but Peroni.st candidates were banned by 
the Anted Forces. Weak civilian gove:mments alternated with military ones; 
both witnessed a large turnover of econanic ministers. It may be noted, 
however, that until the early 1970s political instability was not accrn;,an1ed 
by much bloodletting. 
In light of political instability and the limited recovery of foreif')1 
trade the 2. 2 percent per annum growth in Argentine ~ .~ta GDP between 
1955 and 1973, shown in Table 1, is respectable, and should dispel the myth 
of Argentine econcxnic stagnation. 'Ihe Argentine pe£ <tapJ.ta annual grov.th 
during 195>.-1973 was of course inferior to that of Australia (2. 6 percent) . 
It could be ~ed that Australia, not hav:inp: taken protection to Argentine 
postwar extremes, was in a better position to benefit from the bocrn in 
international trade which occurred durine 1955-1973, particularly given its 
fresh mineral discoveries and its proximity to the fastest growing and most 
voracious market for primary products_ e.g., Japan. One may speculate that 
the reasonable .Arr;ent:ine ~.£. ~t~ growth performance during 1955-1973 ma.v 
have been the result partly of an Argentine population grm.th rate which for 
the first time since 1880 was lower than the Australian one, and partl.v due 
to a catching up with the technological change which had and was occU?Ting 
abroad, particularly in the production of terrperate foodstuffs. Indeed, probably 
the sjngle mst successM. Argentine public policy since 1955 has been the 
support of research and extension agricultural services. Che may also con-­
jecture that the significant Argentine P.,er, ~.!.~ growth during 1955-1973 
1s of'ten overlooked by unawareness of her low cmten;,orary populatioo growth 
(which may be lower than indicated by Table 2, for reasons to be discussed 
later), and has been obscured by sharp cyclical savings. 
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Until fairly recently, both Argentina and Brazil have been conspicuous 
exan;>les of reliance on in;,ort-substituting industrialization as the engine 
of growth, with a corresponding neglect of exports. Yet Table 1 yields the 
' .
following annual growth rates 1n their ~r Cf3Pita GDPs, 1n percentages: 
Argentina Brazil 
19281955 0.5 2.5 
1955-1973 2.2 4.4 
1973-1980 0.9 4.1 
Why this contrast 1n growth perfo:nnance, which has carried Brazilian 
~r ~ita_ GDP in 19~0 near that of Argentina? A first, but partial, 
explanation was suggested 1n Table 7: while Brazilian foreign trade languished 
for mre than three decades following 1928, it did not experience the postwar 
collapse registered in Argentina. This point is brought out roore clearly 
1n Table 9, which presents Brazilian~ capita merchandise exports, 1n 
current dollars, relative to those of Argentina. A mediocre Brazilian export 
performance between the late 1920s and the 1950s was sufficient to generate 
a sharp ga:1n in Brazilian per capita exports relative to those of Argentina. 
Interestingly, about half of that gain disappears during the 1960s; it is 
only during the 1970s that the Brazilian.export drive clearly outdistances 
Argentine efforts, carrying Brazilian~ capita exports beycnd the high relative 
positian they reached during 1950--54. By 1980, Brazilian ~ capita exports 
were 55 percent those of Argentina; 1n 1928 they had been 16 percent. 
As late as 1965-69, the Brazilian export quantll?l ~ capita was about 
what it had been during 1928-29 (Nacianes Un1das, 1976, . p. 31), yet Brazilian 
~ ~~ta GDP in 1970 was mre than three times the 1928 level. Inport 
substituting industrialization 1n Brazil was clearly mre successful than 1n 
Argentina. A larger danestic nerket, the war-time aJJ1ance with the United 
States, and milder species of populism and protecticnism seem doubtful. or 
TABLE 9 
Value of Per capita Brazilian Merchandise Exports,
I 
At CUrrent Dollar Prices,. Relative to Argentina 












Sources: As in Table 7, plus Naciones Unidas, 1976. 
I t 
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incooplete explanations for that Brazilian success. ftk>re f\mdamentally, it 
should be recalled that during the 1920s Brazil was still a lewis-type 
econaey wit}:l a small m:xiern sector, including both exporting and ~rt­
carpeting activities, surrounded by a large subsistence sector, producing 
non-tradeable goods and services. Average labor productivity was much 
higher 1n the roodern than in the subsistence sector; s1m1lar gaps probably 
existed also in marginal labor productivities. In contrast, the Argentine 
econaey by the 1920s had approached neoclassical conditions, in the sense 
that labor in all major sectors probably had roughly similar marg1na.l 
products. 
One may therefore conjecture that much of the Brazilian~ capita 
growth of the last fifty years could be accounted for by a process not 
available to the same degree in Argentina, i.e., a reallocation of labor 
fi'ail a low-productivity subsistence sector to higher productivity occupations, 
whether 1n;x>rt-corrpet1ng or exporting. Such reallocation would raise the 
average darestic product even without an increase in~ capita capitalization, 
nor an jmprovement in the technology, of each sector. 'lhat process does not 
even require getting the balance between import-substitution and exporting 
exactly right, so long as an extreme foreign exchange bottleneck is avoided. 
'lhe coffee and other traditional Brazilian exporting sectors have had until 
recently few wom.es that supply-side considerations would lead them to curtail 
their output, nor that the growth in the danestic demand for coffee and sugar 
would significantly reduce their exportable surplus. 'Ihe!'e has been an awful 
lot of coffee in Brazil siq>ly because there has been an awful lot of 
·Brazilian low-productivity subsistence fanners and workers. In contrast, 
Argentine populism ~d protectionism induced a reallocation of labor, and 
of other inputs, away fran a highly productive Panpean sector toward secondary 
and tertiary activities whose superior social productivity was often questionable. 
• • I 
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'lbe contrast between the .Argentine and Brazilian growth perfonnances 
is particularly striking for 1973-1980: Argentina 1s far mre self-reliant 
in energy than Brazil. 'Ibe sharp decline in Argentine growth cannot be 
explained without reference to the bloodiest political tunooil the country 
has witnessed since the 1850s. 'Ibe 1970s saw the brief return of General 
IJuan D. Peron to the Presidency; his death accelerated trends visible 
earlier. For the first t:1me in .Argentine history the revolutionary left 
became a credible contender for power, proclaiming that "the hour of the 
furnaces" had cane; this challenge produced a strong reaction fran conser­
vative and middle-class elements. 'Ibe violent struggle between guerillas 
and gorillas dwarfed the old Peronists vs anti-Peronists quarrels. Indeed, 
much of the violence occurred w1thin the Peronist movement itself, which 
during the 1.970s became even mre of an ideological hodge-podge than it 
had been in the 1940s, as very different factions tried to inherit the mantle 
of the old leader. The 1970s were probably the first decade in Argentine 
history when the country becane a net source of migrants; exact figures, 
however, are unavailable either for vict:1ms of the quasi-civil-war nor 
for net emigration. Population data "shown in Table 2 for 1973 and 1980 ma..v 
represent overestimates. 
Brazilian political troubles and violence look mild indeed when 
coopared with those of Argentina, just as Brazilian inflation has never 
reached the wild levels registered in Argentina during the last ten years. 
While postwar Argentina political life involved strong independent actors 
such as trade unions, landowners and sundry military factiais, leading 
first to "stalemate politics" and finally.to the violence of the 1970s, 
the ccnt1nuity of Brazilian policies has been based on the assurance given 
by a la,g and alm:>st unbroken history of a state dominated by "the right 
people". 'lllis could be another CC11Sequence of the large Brazilian subsistence 
sector: its reserve 8I1I\Y of the underenployed together with the other 8n'l't)' 
have provided (so far) an unbeatable canb1nat1on for assuring that political 
and econanic leadership remains cami:1.tted to unvarnished capitalist growth. 
Even as ooce it seemed perfectly natural that the ·Brazilian state should 
regulate and watch over the system of slavery, now there is a Brazilian 
concensus that the state is an obvious guide and ally 1n the process of 
capital accurrul.ation, although the exact boundaries between the private and 
public sectors ma..v still generate sane debates. '!he last finy years have 
shattered such feelings 1n the River Pla~ where a state once felt strong 
enough to tackle growth, 1ncane distribution and national autonaJ\Y' objectives, 
achieving little of each. Finally, one may conjecture that Brazilian 
geographical heterog-eneity and econanic diversification has len an;>le roan 
for conpromises and negotiations buttressing the consensus around the growth 
objective, while Argentina is too transparently a Stolper-Sanruelson country 
where a zero-sum view of econanic policy is plausible 1n the short and even 
the nedium tenn. 
6. ENVOI 
Did those who emigrated fran F.astem Europe, Italy, and Spain to the 
River Plate make a mistake, now being corrected as many of their grandchildren 
leave Argentina? By 1970, 1n fact, Spain had reached a~ capita GDP similar 
to that of Argentina, while that of Italy was about 25 percent higher (Kravis 
~ !!·, 1978, pp. 232-236). Argentine liberal traditions sl'x>uld be credited 
with providing migrants and their offsprings with econanic and political 
calditialS far superior to those of their countries or or1g1n at· least until 
quite recently; Ea.stem &Jrope, Italy and Spain have had troubles or their 
own during the years of the Argentine eclipse. Paradoxically, the troubled 
1970s 1n Argentina may have set the bases for political conditions allowing 
\ p 
steadier and m::,re efficient ecooanic policies. 
'!be nurderous violence of the 1970s was unprecedented 1n the Argent1ne 
history of the last one hundred years, and tq,efully it has discredited 
extremists both of the left and the right. A Peronist nr:>vement w.1thout a 
charismatic leader may becane a m:>re Oexible and acceptable participant 
1n political life. 'lhe myth that military governments w.111 necessarily be 
roore stable and efficient than civilian ones appears hopelessly shattered 
1n Argentina. Perhaps swords and furnaces w.111 be put away, and quieter 
hours may com;. Under conditions of reasonable political stability, 
the unsinkable Argentine econoozy could recover fran the catastrophes of 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, including a high external debt for which 
so little growth can be shown. Abundant foodstuffs and energy resources, 
plus an industry which whatever its past costs has shown itself capable 
of exporting, provide solid foundations for a growth which may or may not 
' keep up with those of Australia and Brazil, but which could ass\ll"e a good 
life to all Argentines. 
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